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WHO SHOULD PAY CLEANUP COSTS-THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CORPORATE SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the federal courts examined liability of successor
corporations' under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 These
courts have not uniformly imposed successor liability under
CERCLA' Instead, some courts have adopted the common
law approach of corporate successor liability,4 while others
have found corporate successor liability inapplicable.'
The decision to impose liability on successor corporations
carries significant economic consequences. For example, sub-
stantial financial liability may be imposed upon an acquiring
corporation despite the fact that at the time of acquisition, the
acquirer was unaware of the contamination. More importantly,
in light of the current state of the federal budget, the govern-
ment cannot finance the millions of dollars necessary to clean
up hazardous waste sites.
This comment addresses the division of authority on this
issue by looking at cases on both sides of the successor liability
issue. The comment first examines CERCLA's provisions and
1. Successor corporation "generally means another corporation which,
through amalgamation, consolidation or other legal succession, becomes invested
with rights and assumes burdens of first corporation." Black's Law Dictionary 1431
(6th ed. 1990). '
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, in which the
purpose is "to provide for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites
and to establish a program for appropriate environmental response action to pro-
tect public health and the environment from the danger posed by such sites."
3. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
rev'4 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See infra notes 51 and 153.
4. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86
(3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 734 F. Supp. 793, rev'd, 922
F.2d 1240 (1991). The recent reversal of Anspec does not negate its importance in
this area. The reasoning of the district court remains an available alternative to
another court deciding the successor liability isse. See also infra note 153.
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its legislative history on liability.6 The common law approach
to corporate successor liability and the cases which have adopt-
ed this traditional rule and its variations under CERCLA are
also described.7 Next, the comment evaluates the minority
position which views successor liability as inapplicable to
CERCLA.' Additionally, the comment summarizes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) position on successor lia-
bility and CERCLA.9 Finally, the comment analyzes these vari-
ous positions and proposes a solution to the dilemma" in the
form of a rewritten CERCLA section on liability. The new
section combines the EPA's position with some of the common
law rules into a succinct and broad imposition of liability on
successor corporations."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Corporate Successor Liability and CERCLA
1. The Current Federal Statutory Provision
a. Section 9607(a)"
The section of CERCLA relevant to this discussion is
9607(a). This section lists the parties liable for hazardous sub-
stance clean up costs.'3 Those parties are limited to past and
present owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities, par-
ties who arranged for the transportation of hazardous sub-
stances, and the generators of hazardous substances."
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12-27.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28-152.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 153-66.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 168-78.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 179-248.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 249-51.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id. The statute in full states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
540 [Vol. 32
1992] CLEANUP COSTS 541
b. Successor Liability and CERCLA 's Legislative History
CERCLA does not expressly provide for corporate succes-
sor liability.'5 Instead, the courts have imposed liability by re-
lying on the statute's legislative history.' Although CERCLA's
legislative history is inadequate on many points, statements in
the Congressional Record provide evidence in favor of impos-
ing successor liability under CERCLA."
The Congressional Record states: "It is the intent of the
Committee in this legislation to initiate and establish a compre-
hensive response and financing mechanism to abate and con-
trol the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites."'" CERCLA was established to
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned and operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable.
Id.
15. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
16. See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. In addition to the legislative
history there is the historical argument for imposition of successor liability under
CERCLA:
The historical basis for imposing successor liability is founded upon
principles of equity that seek to prevent creditors of the original cor-
poration from being left without a remedy while the corporation es-
capes responsibility by transferring its assets into a new form. There
is no reason why a corporation should escape liability for the costs
that their pollution imposes on society. Where federal law assigns
responsibility for restitution costs, principles of equity support leaving
a remedy available for the government on behalf of society.
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. The legislative history has been drawn
upon by the courts in their efforts to resolve the successor liability dilemma. For
example, it was stated that:
Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given
the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the prob-
lems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal.
Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused
by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility
for remedying the harmful conditions they created.
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clean up polluted sites around the country. It imposes clean up
liability upon responsible parties with a federal trust fund as a
back-up. 9
CERGLA's goal is to provide Superfund" to finance envi-
ronmental clean up projects when responsible parties refuse to
do so, are insolvent, or have dissolved.2 However, using
Superfund to pay the costs of a clean up is a last resort.
Congress' intent in enacting the statute was to impose liability
upon successor corporations.
Senator Jennings Randolph" stated: "It [was] intended
that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law."" As an example, he pointed to the joint and several lia-
bility concept which was not mentioned in CERCLA.24 De-
spite its omission, joint tortfeasor liability is imposed under
common law or as codified by statutes.25
CERCLA liability was also "intended to give access to the
'deep pockets' of whatever company has the money to pay
regardless of the degree of liability."" Liability may be im-
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn.
1982).
Congressional intent supports the conclusion that when choosing between
the taxpayers or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost. Bene-
fits from use of the pollution as well as savings resulting from the failure to use
non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, its successors,
and their respective stock- holders and accrued only indirectly, if at all, to the
general public. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
20. "Superfund" is a term used to describe the money the government has
set aside to finance the clean up of hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9507
(1988).
21. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980).
22. Senator Randolph is a Democrat from West Virginia.
23. 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980).
24. Id.
25. Id
26. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. See also Acushnet River and New Bed-
ford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (D.
Mass. 1989) which states that:
The Act views response liability as a remedial, rather than a punitive,
measure whose primary aim is to correct the hazardous condition.
Just as there is liability for ordinary torts or contractual claims, the
obligation to take necessary steps to protect the public should be im-
posed on a successor corporation.
The costs associated with clean up must be absorbed some-
where. Congress has emphasized funding by responsible parties, but if
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posed on all parties regardless of how remotely they are con-
nected to the waste. Ultimately, in imposing clean up liability
"the issue is one of fundamental fairness.
"27
2. The Common Law Approach
Under the common law, a rule developed that in an asset
purchase a successor corporation was not liable for the actions
of its predecessor.2 An asset purchase occurs when "one cor-
poration buys all of the assets of another."" If acquisition is
by statutory merger," consolidation,"' or any of the other ex-
ceptions discussed below,2 liability is imposed.
they cannot be ascertained or cannot pay the sums necessary, federal
monies may be used.
Expenses can be borne by two sources: the entities which had
a specific role in the production or continuation of the hazardous
condition, or the taxpayers through federal funds. CERCLA leaves no
doubt that Congress intended the burden to fall on the latter only
when the responsible parties lacked the wherewithal to meet their
obligations.
Id.
27. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980).
28. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990).
29. Smith Land Improvment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
30. A "merger means the absorption of one corporation by another; in which
the latter retains its name and corporate identity with the added capital, franchises
and powers of the merged corporation. It is the uniting of two or more corpora-
tions by the transfer of property to one of them, which continues in existence,
the others being merged into it." 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). See also
Kemos, Inc. v. Bader, 545 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1977) (merger is the absorption of
one corporation into another); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361, 365 (3rd Cir. 1974) ("A merger of two corporations contemplates that
one will be absorbed by the other and go out of existence, but the absorbing
corporation will remain.").
31. Consolidation is a "combination by agreement between two or more cor-
porations of the same or different states, under authority of law, by which their
rights, franchises, privileges and property are united, and become the rights, fran-
chises, privileges and property of a single corporation, composed generally, al-
though not necessarily, of the stockholders of the original corporations." Fletcher,
supra note 30, § 7041. See also Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D.
Colo. 1968) (definition of consolidation and general rules regarding successor lia-
bility); Atlantic & G.R.R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359 (1878) (consolidation dis-
solves the original companies and creates a new corporation).
32. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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There are various policy reasons behind this rule of
non-liability." An important judicial concern when imposing
successor liability is the protection of dissenting shareholders
and creditors.5" Additionally, the alienability of corporate as-
sets and the proper assessment of taxes are other areas the
courts believe should be protected."5
There are exceptions to this general rule regarding asset
purchases. Liability is imposed if: "(1) [t]he purchasing corpo-
ration expressly or impliedly agree[d] to assume the liability;
(2) [t]he transaction amount[ed] to a de facto' consolidation
or merger; (3) [t]he purchasing corporation is merely a contin-
uation of the selling corporation; or (4) [t]he transaction was
fraudulently entered into in order to escape liability.""' Nei-
ther the general rule nor its exceptions are mentioned in
CERCLA's liability provisions.
As noted, the statute's text does not address corporate
successor liability and the question has been heavily litigated.
Many courts rely on the decision in Smith Land & Improvement
33. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3rd Cir. 1986) (where a con-
struction worker who was hurt while operating a crane sued the corporate buyer
of the crane manufacturer's assets to recover for injuries received).
34. Id. See also Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corpora-
tion Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906, 909 (1983). Creditors lose if a corporation's
liabilities disappear after a merger, or other corporate consolidation. If those liabil-
ities disappear in successor situations, the corporation has incentive to merge or
otherwise consolidate and avoid its debts. Dissenting shareholders lose appraisal
rights in de facto merger or consolidation in the absence of successor liability.
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 815-16 (N.J. 1981).
35. Polius 802 F.2d at 78. If a corporation knows it will be liable for a
predecessor's actions, it will carefully evaluate any acquisition decisions. Corpora-
tions will have greater difficulty raising capital by asset sales, mergers, etc. if suc-
cessor liability looms overhead.
36. 'Under the de facto merger doctrine, even though the particular combina-
tion or transaction may be otherwise labeled by the parties, it may in legal effect
be a merger or consolidation so as to confer upon dissenting shareholders the
right to receive cash payments for their shares." Fletcher, supra note 30, §
7045.10. See also Arnold Graphics Indus. v. Independant Agent Center, 775 F.2d
38, 42 (1985). "A de facto merger occurs where one corporation is absorbed by
another, but without compliance with the statutory requirements for a merger." Id.
37. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990). Asarco owned a copper smelter in Washington which produced a
by-product called slag. This by-product was sold by an intermediary to
Louisiana-Pacific and subsequently leached into the groundwater and soil. Asarco
sued Louisiana-Pacific and L-Bar, the successor to the intermediary, under
CERCLA to recover clean up costs. Id. at 1262.
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Corp. v. Celotex Corp.'s when adopting successor liability under
CERCLA."9 Smith Land discussed successor liability in the con-
text of a consolidation or merger, either of which is a tradi-
tional area of application for successor liability under common
law.'
3. The Adoption of the Common Law Approach
a. Merger and Consolidation
The traditional areas of liability for successor corporations
are merger and consolidation;" Smith Land adopted this
premise as a basis for liability in CERCLA causes of action.
4
In Smith Land, the plaintiff owned a piece of polluted land."
The plaintiff cleaned the site pursuant to an agreement with
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and subsequently
sued the defendants as corporate successors to the company
which polluted and then sold them the land."The court began its discussion of corporate successor
liability under CERGLA with a general observation. It stated
that "[c]hanges in ownership of a corporation's stock will not
affect the rights and obligations of the company itself. The
corporation survives as an entity separate and distinct from its
shareholders even if all the stock is purchased by another cor-
poration.""
The court believed it lacked authority for its position un-
der CERCLA because the statute was "hastily conceived and
briefly debated."' Many important issues were not addressed
38. 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988).
39. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990);
American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg., No. 89-C0168 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10999 (N.D. I1. Aug. 20, 1990).
40. 851 F.2d at 91. As Blackstone stated, "all the individual embers that have
existed from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist,
are but one person in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river
Thames is still the same river, though the parties which compose it are changing
every instant." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467-69, quoted in Polius v.
Clarke Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3rd Cir. 1986).
41. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 87.
44. Id. at 87-88.
45. I at 91.
46. Id. That is, because the statute was passed in late November and early
December of 1980, Congress was in a hurry to enact some type of environmental
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in the legislation47 and, to impose liability, the court filled in
CERCLA's "blanks" on this issue. The fact successor liability
was left out did not preclude its imposition.
The court in Smith Land also focused upon the remedial
purpose of CERCLA.48 This policy requires clean up obliga-
tions to be placed on some private party," preferably the one
responsible for the pollution. If the responsible party lacks the
funds, then the federal government will pay.'
According to Smith Land, when financing is available from
either the successor corporation or the public, the former
.should be chosen.' This is the rational choice because the
successor receives greater benefit from the polluting activities
than does the public. The predecessor corporation benefits
because manufacturing processes which cause pollution gener-
ally are cheaper to implement than technologically advanced
methods. Additionally, in the case of hazardous waste dump-
ing, the costs of storing toxics in sealed containers in moni-
tored landfills is more expensive than carting metal drums off
to the riverbed for "storage." These savings to the original
corporation make it cheaper for the successor to acquire; the
costs of monitoring landfills or implementing pollution con-
trols are not included in the purchase price, as they would be
if the corporation performed those activities. The predecessor
corporation benefits from the pollution-causing production
methods or realized savings from improper disposal and so its
successor also benefits." The public, on the other hand, nei-
legislation before it recessed. As the court stated, "[i]t is not surprising that, as a
hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to ad-
dress many important issues, including corporate successor liability." Id.
47. Id. Issues which were not addressed in CERCLA include corporate succes-
sor liability and whether or not a federal common law should be developed to
supplement the statute's explicit provisions. Id.
48. Id. "The Act views response liability as a remedial, rather than a punitive,
measure whose primary aim is to correct the hazardous condition. Just as there is
liability for ordinary torts or contractual claims, the obligation to take necessary
steps to protect the public should be imposed on a successor corporation." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 91-92. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1991) describing the
"Superfund" from which the government will use to pay the response costs of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites. For example, the President shall use the money
in the Fund for "1) Payment of governmental response costs incurred." Id.
51. Smith Land & Improvment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3rd
Cir. 1988). See also Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. Smith Lan4 851 F.2d at 92. See also Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184
546 [Vol. 32
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ther created the pollution nor derived any benefit from these
practices.
The Smith Land majority was persuaded by the fact that
"[i]n general, when two corporations merge pursuant to statu-
tory provisions, liabilities become the responsibility of the sur-
viving company.""3 When one corporation "ceases to exist and
the other corporation continues in existence, the latter corpo-
ration is liable for the debts, contracts and torts of the former,
at least to the extent of the property and assets received."'
In corporate consolidations, the court reasoned that liabili-
ty was appropriate because "unless otherwise provided by
statute, the new company assumes the debts and liabilities of
the constituent companies."" It is logical to then apply lia-
bility through these basic principles of merger and consolida-
tion to suits against corporate successors under CERCLA.
The court in Smith Land did not address potential corpo-
rate liability in an asset purchase.' It also did not detail the
four exceptions to liability under the common law, i.e. the "de
facto" merger, 7 express' or implied assumption of liability, 9
(9th Cir. 1979).
53. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91.
54. Id.
55. I1.
56. Traditionally there was no liability for a successor corporation in an asset
purchase. Id.
57. "Under the de facto merger doctrine, even though the particular combina-
tion or transaction may be otherwise labeled by the parties, it may, in the legal
effect be a merger or consolidation so as to confer upon dissenting shareholders
the right to receive cash payments for their shares." FLETCHER, supra note 30, §
7045.10.
58. "Where the assumption agreement [to assume debts and liabilities] is
based on a valuable consideration, and the receipt of the property of the other
company is a sufficient consideration, the company assuming such debts or liabili-
ties becomes liable, provided, it seems, there has been an acceptance of, or
aquiescence in, the agreement by the creditors of the corporation which was origi-
nally indebted." FLETCHER, supra note 30, § 7114. See also Pierce v. United States,
255 U.S. 398, 403 (1921); Krull v. Celotex Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
59. Implied liability may arise in special circumstances, "where a corporation
purchases the property and franchises of another company, including property for
which the latter was under an obligation to pay, and to which it could acquire no
right without payment .... [T]he conduct or representations relied upon must
show an intention." FLETCHER, supra note 30, § 7124. See also Araserv, Inc. v. Bay
State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n., 437 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Mass. 1977)
(implied liability is found if the facts or circumstances show an assumption of the
predecessor's obligations).
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mere continuation' and fraud6' exceptions. These excep-
tions were developed by later cases adopting the common law
position. '
b. Asset Purchases
Following the principles in Smith Land, the United States
District Court, in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,' adopt-
ed the common law rule imposing liability upon successor
corporations undertaking an asset purchase.' Under the com-
mon law, asset purchasers were not subject to liability as suc-
cessor corporations.' The court, after considering the issue of
corporate successor liability under CERCLA, reiterated this
general premise." In Asarco, the defendant impleaded the suc-
cessor to the company that marketed its waste-waste which
was the basis of Asarco's CERCLA problem.67
The majority opinion applied the common law rule of
successor liability and found the third party defendant not
liable." In doing so, the court concluded that general succes-
sor liability analysis was applicable to an asset sale and the
"traditional rules of successor liability in operation in most
60. To determine if the mere continuation doctrine applies courts look at "a
common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders between the selling and
purchasing corporations." Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1458
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
61. If the transfer is a fraud upon the creditors of the predecessor corpora-
tion, the claims transfer to the successor. FLETCHER, supra note 30, § 7125. See
also Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. N.Y. 1985). "[T]he creditors
defrauded by the transfer may, in equity, follow the property into the hands of
the new corporation, and subject it to the satisfaction of their claims, or hold the
new corporation liable to the extent of its value." FLETCHER, supra note 30, §
7125.
62. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990);
American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Class Mfg., No. 89-C0168 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10999 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1990); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
63. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
64. 1& at 1263.
65. Id. Unless, of course, one of the four exceptions applies. See also supra
notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
66. Asarco, 909 F.2d at 1263.
67. 1I at 1262.
68. Id. at 1263, 1266.
[Vol. 32
CLEANUP COSTS
states should govern. " Accordingly, the rule of non-liability
for asset purchases applied."
Asset purchasers are possibly not held liable because they
merely bought the pieces of a dissolved corporation. The ac-
quiring corporation is buying part of an entity which no longer
exists in any form. In contrast, successor liability is found
where the successor combines with, and becomes part of, the
predecessor corporation.
The successor liability theory seeks to impose responsibili-
ty where it is equitable to do so." The four exceptions" to
non-liability serve to impose financial obligations on guilty
corporations striving to avoid them. The next part of this dis-
cussion concerns the four exceptions to non-liability of asset
purchasers as successors.
c. Exceptions to Non-Liability
1) Assumption of Liability
The United States district court in United States v. Chrysler
Corp.7" built upon the principles of CERCLA successor liability
established by previous federal court interpretations of state
law. 4 The decision also examined whether or not liability wasassumed by the successor corporation."
In Chrysler, defendants Knotts and Harvey formed a corpo-
ration to haul garbage and operate a school bus service.7' To
dispose of the waste it was transporting under the haulage
69. I at 1263.
70. Id.
71. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-152.
73. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1997 (D. Del.
Aug. 28, 1990). Harvey and Knotts began a partnership which hauled garbage and
operated a bus service. They also purchased a site (the basis of the CERCLA lia-
bility) on which they could dispose of the commercial waste they were hauling.
The partnership was incorporated, and later personal difficulties resulted in an
agreement splitting the businesses. Knotts, Inc. was formed and then acquired the
bus service in exchange for 100% of its stock. Harvey & Knotts, Inc. then ex-
changed Knotts, Inc. stock for all Harvey & Knotts stock owned by the Knotts
family. Id. at 1998.
74. Id. at 2006.
75. Id. at 2000-01.
76. Id. at 1998-99.
1992]
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contracts, the corporation purchased a tract of land." In a
later stock exchange agreement the original corporation was
bought out by the successor company, Knotts." CERCLA lia-
bility flowed from the original corporation to the successor
corporation because of pollution on the land where the dump-
ing occurred."
The court in Chrysler noted that the same concerns rele-
vant to the "common law liability of a corporation for the torts
of its predecessor are equally applicable to the assessment of
responsibility for clean-up costs under CERCLA." ° Chrysler
then adopted the judge-made successor liability rule for
CERCLA causes of action.8' The court stated that although
"CERCLA does not directly address the issue of corporate
successor liability ... the scant legislative history indicates that
Congress relied upon the courts to articulate a federal com-
mon law to supplement the statute."" The court also exam-
ined whether or not there was an assumption of liability by
Knotts, the successor, for the acts of Harvey & Knotts, the
predecessor.'
The court scrutinized the agreement creating Knotts, spe-
cifically the phrase stating that "the operating expenses or
liabilities pending legal action or any cause of action ... aris-
ing prior to settlement shall be divided."' It held this state-
ment was an express assumption of liability by Knotts for any
suits brought against Harvey & Knotts, and found Knotts
liable under CERCLA for the dumping of Harvey & Knotts."
As Chrysler shows, determining whether a corporation
expressly or impliedly assumes liability is an issue of contract
interpretation. 7 On the other hand, the cases considering de
77. Id. at 1998.
78. Id. All of this occurred because of personal tension between the individu-
als Harvey and Knotts. Id.
79. I& at 2003.
80. IM at 2001 n.21.
81. Id. at 2001.
82. Id.
83. 1U at 2002-03.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2004.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 59.
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facto mergers present a more difficult determination because
of the many factors involved.'
2) De Facto Merger
The United States District Court in American National Can
Co. v. Kerr Glass Manufacturing' was persuaded by the deci-
sions in Smith Land and Asarco.9 By adopting another excep-
tion and allowing the imposition of successor liability, the
court continued the trend begun by the decision of Smith
Land."  In National Can, the third party defendant,
Armstrong, acquired Whitall Tatum in a stock exchange.
Armstrong then transferred Whitall Tatum's assets to itself and
dissolved Whitall Tatum. ' Defendant Kerr sued Armstrong as
successor to Whitall Tatum for Whitall Tatum's dumping at a
site Kerr bought from Armstrong. Armstrong had acquired it
in the transaction with Whitall Tatum." The court addressed
whether or not the acquisition of Whitall Tatum was a defacto
merger.' In deciding this issue, it determined a de facto merg-
er exists if:
(1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the
seller in terms of continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets and operations;
(2) there is continuity of shareholders;95
(3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dis-
solves as soon as legally and practically possible; and
(4) the purchasing corporation assumes the obliga-
tions of the seller necessary for uninterrupted continuation
88. De facto consolidation is subsumed by the de facto merger exception. This
is because "[wihere a particular corporate combination is in legal effect a merger
or consolidation . . . such transaction is a de facto merger." FLETCHER, supra note
30, § 7045.10.
89. No. 89-C0168 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999 (N.D. 11. Aug. 20, 1990).
90. Id. at *15-*16.
91. Id. at *32.
92. Id. at *11.
93. 1d.
94. Id. at *18.
95. A continuity of shareholders results when the "purchasing corporation
paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately
coming to be held by the shareholder of the selling corporation so that they be-
come a constituent part of the purchasing corporation." Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015
(D. Mass. 1989).
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of business operations."
In evaluating these four factors, none is solely determina-
tive of the outcome, but all four are required.' The purpose
of the defacto merger exception in imposing liability is to "min-
imize unfairness to the successor."" Minimizing unfairness is
important because, generally, a successor corporation does not
foresee liability for the predecessor's environmental mishaps.
The court also noted that the predecessor and successor
corporations maintained common shareholders." Since the
successor corporation continues the same business as the pre-
decessor, and CERCLA liability arises from hazardous waste
disposal, the predecessor's dissolution means the successor
remains to accept responsibility.."
In essence, the de facto merger doctrine is a "'device for
avoiding injustice when a merger has been called something
else.'"'0 ' For example, a corporation may tailor the merger to
look like an asset purchase so as to avoid successor liability.
96. American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Class Mfg., No. 89-C0168, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1990). See also Mell J. Branch-Roy,
Corporate Successor Liability for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims Part I, 19 COLO.
LAW. 867, 868 (1990) (hereinafter Toxic Tort 1] where it was written that "[a] key
factor to buttress a finding of de facto merger for successor liability is a transfer
of stock as consideration. A finding of de facto merger is inconsequential where
the assets are sold for cash, the relationship of the shareholders to their respec-
tive corporations remains unchanged and there is an absence of continuity of
shareholders."
97. 712 F. Supp. at 1015.
98. American Nat'l Can, No. 89-C0168, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *18
(N.D. Il. Aug. 20, 1990). See also Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chem. Co., 709
F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (discussion of de facto mergers); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir. 1985) (policy considerations behind
de facto merger noted).
99. American Nat'l Can, No. 89-C0168, 1990 U.S.. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *11.
100. Id.
A de facto merger requires continuity of shareholders, meaning
the successor in a de facto merger is owned in part by the same
people who owned the predecessor. In addition, in order to accom-
plish a de facto merger, the successor must continue the same enter-
prise as its predecessor. Ostensibly, CERCLA liability arises because
the enterprise was involved in the disposal of hazardous waste. Since
the predecessor necessarily dissolves as a result of the merger, only
the successor remains to accept responsibility for the predecessor's
environmental misuse.
Ild. (citations omitted).
1 101. Philadelphia Elec., 762 F.2d at 312, cited in American Nat7l Can, No.
89-C0168, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *25 (N.D. III. Aug. 20, 1990).
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This is unfair to the injured parties who would otherwise re-
ceive relief under the imposition of common law successor
liability. If one of the requirements is not met, the de facto
merger exception does not apply.Y This procedural difficulty
led to the development of the mere continuation exception"os
as an easily applicable alternative to the de facto merger
test.Y
3) Mere Continuation
Under the mere continuation theory, courts look at a
"'number of factors to analyze whether the purchasing corpo-
ration is simply a "new hat" [a new name] for the seller.'""°
The court in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co."4 employed this doc-
trine to impose corporate successor liability under CERCLA.
This case applied the mere continuation exception on grounds
independent of those in the Third Circuit's decision in Smith
Land.
In Thomas Solvent, the corporate defendant distributed
and transported industrial solvents."7 Two sites owned by the
company were found by the EPA to have groundwater contam-
ination;"°8 Thomas Solvent then reorganized its corporate
structure and formed several "spinoff" corporations."
102. Id. at *18.
103. Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged PCB
Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 n.15 (D.C. Mass. 1989). The court noted the
de facto merger exception incorporates the mere continuation exception. "The key
element of a "continuation" is a common identity of the officers, directors, and
shareholders in the selling and purchasing corporations . . . . For a de facto merg-
er to occur, there must be continuity of the successor and predecessor corpora-
tions." Id. (citations omitted).
104. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Carolina Transformer, 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. N.C. 1989).
105. See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1458 (W.D. Mich.
1988). See also 7 CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 154.05 (1985) which distin-
guishes between de facto merger and mere continuation.
The distinction may lie in the fact that a de facto merger may be found
when the corporation buys the assets of another; to invoke the continuity of en-
terprise doctrine, there need not be two corporations involved in the beginning.
Rather, one enterprise may dissolve and another spring up to take over the busi-
ness. See lift v. Forage King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 1982).
106. 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
107. Id. at 1448.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1450. In this case a "spinoff" corporation was the creation of sev-
eral small corporations which divided and took over the business operations of
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The majority of Thomas Solvent's assets were transferred
to the spinoff corporations, significantly decreasing the origi-
nal corporation's assets."' The value of assets received by
each new corporation greatly exceeded the value of the liabili-
ties each assumed."' In analyzing the mere continuation doc-
trine and its relevance to Thomas Solvent, the court stated that
"[i]f the new corporation is simply a continuation of the old
one, a claimant may successfully pursue the new corporation
for satisfaction of a debt or judgment." 2
The indicia of mere continuation include "a common
identity of officers, directors and stockholders between the sell-
ing and purchasing corporations.""' The court found mere
continuation existed in Thomas Solvent because one individual,
Richard Thomas, owned 100 per cent of the stock of all the
corporations, each board consisted of common directors, and
there was a continuity of staff."4 The spinoff corporations op-
erated substantially the same business, and provided the same
products and services as Thomas Solvent Co. Additionally,
when Thomas Solvent closed its operations some of the em-
ployees were transferred to the payroll of the spinoff corpo-
rations."'
The court in Thomas Solvent noted "the policy reasons
supporting the doctrine of successor liability militate in fa-
vor"" 6 of its application where mere continuation is found.
"[T]here are unpaid liabilities for environmental damage left
with a corporate shell quite unable to make restitution.""' 7
the original corporation. Id.
110. Id. For example, Thomas Solvent's federal income tax returns showed in
1982 its total assets dropped from $3,190,053 to $620,842. In addition, the re-
tained earnings were reduced by $1,228,719. Id.
111. Id. For example, "Thomas Solvent-Detroit received assets of $1,025,435
and retained earnings of $608,959 while assuming liabilities of $577,377. Thomas
Solvent-Muskegeon received assets of $348,505 and retained earnings of $174,245
while assuming liabilities of $154,160. Thomas Solvent-Indiana received assets of
$443,832 and retained earnings of $281,468 while assuming liabilities of $142,264."
Id.
112. Id. at 1458.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1458-59.
116. Id. at 1459.
117. Id.
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The court concluded that "[t]here is no reason why a cor-
poration should escape liability for costs that their pollution
imposes on society.""' Equitable principles demand an avail-
able remedy for the government to pursue against responsible
parties on society's behalf..
A majority of the court believed successor liability was
favored under CERCLA "because it is the successor corpora-
tions who have benefited from any polluting practices of their
predecessor." '" Thomas Solvent also decided the imposition of
broad liability' was desirable because "it shifts remedial
cleanup costs to the parties responsible for creating the haz-
ard; it creates incentives for safer practices; and it encourages
defendants to locate and implead other responsible par-
ties."" In light of the factual circumstances surrounding the
spinoff corporations and equitable considerations, the court
applied successor liability.'
Two derivative theories of the mere continuation doctrine
grew out of the decision in Thomas Solvent. Specifically, United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co."4 looked at the substantial
continuity exception, while Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,
Inc."'25 examined the continuing business enterprise exception.
a) Substantial Continuity Exception
The federal district court in Carolina Transformer strayed
from the path forged by Smith Land and its progeny. Applying
a new exception to successor non-liability, the court in Carolina
Transformer opened the door wider to allow greater corporate
liability for environmental misuse.
118. Id.
119. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (W.D. Mich.
1988).
120. 1I See also text accompanying notes 51-52.
121. "[Alpplying the successor liability doctrine to prevent shrinking the area
of potential liability is a practice that is in accord with the practice of courts that
have interpreted CERCLA actions broadly in favor of the government." Thomas
Solvent, 725 F. Supp. at 1459.
122. 1&
123. Id. at 1458.
124. 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. N.C. 1989).
125. This case was already discussed as an asset purchase, see supra text accom-
panying notes 63-72.
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Defendant Carolina Transformer repaired and sold rebuilt
electrical transformers. 6 FayTranCo was incorporated by an
officer and director of Carolina Transformer and another em-
ployee."7 FayTranCo also repaired and rebuilt transformers
using many Carolina employees. 8 After FayTranCo incorpo-
rated, Carolina moved its operation to FayTranCo offices and
the "[o]fficers, directors and employees of Carolina Transform-
er became officers, directors, and employees of
FayTranCo."' The customers of each company were the
same and the books of the two companies were kept as
one.'1°
The court in Carolina Transformer applied the substantial
continuity'' test to find liability. Substantial continuity is
found to exist when affirmative responses are given to the
following queries: "Whether the business of both employers
was the same, whether the employees of the new company
were doing the same job, and whether the new company pro-
duced the same product for essentially the same custom-
ers."
3 2
The court found that FayTranCo continued Carolina
Transformer's business operations3 ' and hired Carolina
Transformer employees to do the same jobs "earning the same
wages and maintaining the same accrued leave time,"'"4 and
therefore imposed liability. FayTranCo was held responsible
for Carolina Transformer's CERCLA response costs.'5
126. 739 F. Supp. at 1033.
127. Id. at 1033-34.
128. Id. at 1033.
129. Id. at 1034.
130. Id.
131. "If there is 'substantial continuity['] between a successor corporation and
its predecessor, the successor can be bound by the acts of the predecessor." Id. at
1039.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The term response means "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial ac-
tion" including the related enforcement activities and the costs associated with
these practices. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24),(25) (1982), amended by 100 Stat. 1615 (1986).
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b) Continuing Business Enterprise Exception
As noted earlier,"M  Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,
Inc.17 applied common law successor liability rules in an asset
purchase context. Another aspect of Asarco dealt with the
court's refusal to follow a proposed exception to successor
non-liability.' Defendant Asarco argued the court should
adopt and apply the continuing business enterprise exception
to the third-party defendant.'
Asarco had impleaded L-Bar as a third-party defendant as
the successor to Industrial Mineral Products (IMP), which had
improperly marketed Asarco's waste. 4 The court noted the
continuing business enterprise exception but declined to apply
it in lieu of mere continuation.'
The elements of the defendant's proposed continuing
business enterprise test were: "1) continuity of employees,
supervisory personnel and physical location; 2) production of
the same product; 3) retention of the same name; 4) continuity
of general business operations; [and] 5) purchaser holding
itself out as a continuation of the seller." Asarco did not
decide whether the continuing business enterprise test consti-
tuted an additional exception to the rule of non-liability. The
court was ambivalent because it believed the new doctrine was
not relevant to the controversy before it.' Continuing busi-
136. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
137. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
138. I at 1265.
139. 1i The continuing business enterprise exception is a more expansive ver-
sion of mere continuation because the same directors and officers are not re-
quired. The Ninth Circuit applied the continuing business enterprise test in Oner
II v. United States EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979), because Oner II (the suc-
cessor) was formed to buy the assets of a corporation liable under an environmen-
tal statute. Oner II engaged in the same business of distributing pesticides and
maintained the same employees. Asarco, 909 F.2d at 1265.
140. Asarco, 909 F. 2d at 1262.
141. Id. at 1265-66.
142. 1I at 1265 n.7 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175
(5th Cir. 1985)).
143. 1I at 1265. The court distinguished Asarco from a previous case, Oner II
v. United States EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979), which followed the continuing
business enterprise exception. The most important difference was that in Asarco, L-
Bar did not continue IMP's waste business. Asarco, 909 F.2d at 1265. Thus, this
exception still could be. applied to corporate successor liability under CERCLA-the
court did not foreclose its adoption in the right circumstances.
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ness enterprise liability has not yet been imposed as an excep-
tion, unlike the next theory, fraud.
4) Fraud
The final exception to non-liability for corporate succes-
sors under the common law is fraud. This exception focuses
on fraudulent transfers undertaken to avoid creditors. 4 4 "A
fraudulent conveyance may impose successor liability when the
parties to the transaction do not exercise good faith."'45 The
transaction is presumptively valid if a purchasing corporation
receives a transfer of assets in good faith and pays full consid-
eration. 46 The parties must prove that "the transaction was
made in good faith and for value."
47
No cases have specifically applied the fraud exception
under CERCLA. However, the decision in Thomas Solvent co-
mes closest to the exception. 48 When the reorganization of
Thomas Solvent created the spinoff corporations, one reason
given for the activity was "concerns about potential environ-
mental liability."'49 However, the court did not discuss the
fraud exception"w or the potential liability under this theory.
The court believed the mere continuation doctrine to be the
strongest justification for imposing CERCLA liability. 5'
144. FLETCHER, supra note 30, § 7125. "[T]he creditors defrauded by the trans-
fer may, in equity, follow the property into the hands of the new corporation,
and subject it to the satisfaction of their claims, or hold the new corporation
liable to the extent of its value." Fletcher, supra note 30, § 7125. See also Allied
Indus. Int'l v. AGFA-Gevaert, 688 F. Supp. 1516 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peterson v.
Harville, 445 F. Supp. 16 (D. Or. 1977) (for the rule of non-liability to apply
there needs to be good faith and fair consideration).
145. Mefl J. Branch-Roy, Corporate Successor Liability for Environmental and Toxic
Tort Claims Part II, 19 CoLo. LAw. 1085, 1086 (1990) [hereinafter Toxic Tonl I].
146. FLETCHER, supra note 30, § 7125. See Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass.
1989).
147. Toxic Tort II, supra note 145, at 1086. See also Wabash, St. Louis & Pac.
Ry. v. Ham, 114 U.S. 587 (1885) (corporations can only relieve their property
from debts by sale or transfer in good faith and for a full consideration).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 106-24.
149. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1449 (W.D. Mich.
1988).
150. The court had already ruled against Thomas Solvent under the Michigan
Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 566.17 because it inferred fraudulent intent from
the circumstances surrounding the conveyances. Id. at 1456. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 566.17 (West 1967).
151. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. at 1457-58.
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The above cases examined the adoption and application of
the common law to CERCLA. The following case is an exam-
ple of the minority position of non-liability under CERCLA for
corporate successors.
5 2
III. REJECTION OF CORPORATE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA
In Ampec Co. v. Johmon Controls,' the United States Dis-
trict Court held that the application of common law corporate
successor liability to CERCLA cases was incorrect. The plaintiff
bought property from Ultraspherics, which had previously pol-
luted the soil." After the sale, Ultraspherics and another cor-
poration merged and Ultraspherics became the surviving'
corporation.' Anspec sued Ultraspherics to recover the costs
of cleaning up the polluted site.'57
The court noted that although successor liability may be
desirable, the decision to impose it should be left to Con-
gress."'~ Under CERCLA, liability is limited to generators,
transporters, and past and present owners or operators of haz-
152. The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed the issue. American Nat'l Can
Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg., No. 89-C0168, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *16 (N.D.
I1. Aug. 20, 1990). But, on the motion for reconsideration the Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, determined it did support Smith Land and the adoption of succes-
sor liability. Id. at *5.
153. 734 F. Supp. 793. (E.D. Mich. 1989), rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). Al-
though the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed Anspec, deciding to
follow successor liability under Smith Land, that does not negate the importance
of the district court's reasoning and decision. The analysis and conclusion of the
district court could readily be adopted by the jurisdictions yet to decide the suc-
cessor liability issue. See supra note 5. The Sixth Circuit decision also opened up
additional issues for corporate CERCLA liability. The court stated: 'If they are
parent corporations rather than successors, there are legal issues not presented in
this appeal which the district court must address.- Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1247.
154. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 793-94.
155. A "surviving corporation" is found when one corporation is absorbed by
another and the former dissolves while the existence of the latter continues on
with the rights, etc. of the former in addition to its own. Fletcher, supra note 30,
§ 7082. See also Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 818 F.2d 1405 (8th Cir. 1987); Engel v.
Teleprompter Corp., 703 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1983) .(the absorbing corporation
which remains is the survivor); Parra v. Production Mach. Co., 611 F. Supp. 221
(E.D. N.Y. 1985) (discussing the mere continuation exception and the circumstanc-
es surrounding a surviving corporation); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United States, 308
F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
156. Anspec, 734 F. Supp. at 794.
157. Id. at 793
158. Id. at 796.
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ardous substances. 5 "Successor corporations are not listed as
one of the potentially responsible parties under CERCLA"
and liability does not follow a corporation to its successor. 6
On the basis of the statutory omission, the district court in
Anspec held the changes in the original Ultraspherics made the
successor Ultraspherics not liable. 62 The court believed
CERCLA's goals were obtainable without successor liability.s
"The owner and/or operator of the property is potentially
liable, the actual polluter is liable and successor corporations,
to the extent they are polluters or owners or operators, are
still potentially liable. Where a potentially liable party does not
exist, the Superfund is used to finance the clean up." "
The court decided only Congress could change the list of
potentially liable parties. 65 This is because Congress alone
can adequately investigate and statutorily impose successor
liability." The division between the courts' decisions does
not end with Anspec. Between the polarized camps of Smith
Land and Anspec lies the position of the EPA.
IV. THE EPA APPROACH TO CERCLA SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The EPA determined that successor liability applies under
a theory of continuity of business operations.'67 In a memo-
randum by Courtney Price, Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring,"M the EPA outlined
its position on corporate successor liability. Potential corporate
159. Id. at 795. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
160. Anspec, 734 F. Supp. at 795. No relevant changes were made to CERCLA
in this area during the 1986 amendments when Congress had opportunity to do
so. Id.
161. Id. at 796.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Smith Land & Improvment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 n.2
(3rd Cir. 1988). For more information on the EPA's position see (author), EPA's
Polity of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 78
(1986-1987).
168. Memorandum of Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforce-
ment and Compliance Monitoring, United States Environmental Protection Agency
June 13, 1984) (on file with the SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Memo-
randum].
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successor liability is found where a corporation, as a prior own-
er or operator of a hazardous waste site, transfers corporate
ownership to another entity.69 If this occurs, the issue be-
comes whether or not the predecessor's hazardous waste liabili-
ty was also transferred. 70
Price's memorandum outlined the common law doctrine
of successor liability' and then advanced a new approach.
Liability under the new approach, focusing on the continuity
of business operations, is imposed if the "new corporation
continues substantially the same business operations as the
selling corporation.""n Price noted this theory is adopted in
product liability cases because application of the traditional
rules imposes harsh and inequitable results upon plaintiffs. 7
That premise also makes the theory pertinent to CERCLA
cases.
To impose liability under the EPA's plan, a successor cor-
poration must acquire the predecessor's assets and continue
the same basic business operations as the predecessor; continu-
ity of ownership is not required.' The memorandum pro-
posed that the EPA use continuity of business operations as an
exception to non-liability in addition to the traditional exemp-
tions.175
As the cases above indicate, some jurisdictions have adopt-
ed the traditional rules7" while at least one court has held no
liability should be imposed upon corporate successors. 77 Be-
tween these two' positions lies the plan proposed by the EPA,
modifying the common law.
78
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 11-13.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id. at 12-13. This approach was adopted in order to provide an "adequate
remedy and protect injured consumers." Id. at 13.
174. Id. at 14. According to Price, the disregard of continuity of ownership
differentiates this doctrine from the "de facto" and "mere continuation" exceptions.
Id.
175. Id. at 16. Recall that the traditional exceptions are: (1) implied/express
assumption of liability; (2) de facto merger; (3) mere continuation; and (4) fraud.
176. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
177. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See supra notes 5 and 153.
178. See Memorandum, supra note 168.
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V. ANALYSIS
When imposing successor liability, the courts in the above
cases discussed CERCLA's legislative history.'" Many courts
determined CERCLA's purpose to be remedial and assumed
that Congress "forgot" to include successor liability in the stat-
ute. The courts superimposed the common law doctrine onto
the existing CERCLA framework."8
Examining the text of CERCLA section 9607,"'1 nothing
indicates that Congress intended the imposition of successor
liability. The statute lists potentially responsible parties (PRPs),
including past and present owners and operators, generators
of hazardous waste and transporters." This list is explicit
and was not amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 " to include successor liabili-
ty.'" However, the legislative history of CERCLA, and the in-
ferences that can be drawn from it, justify the imposition of
successor liability.8 Congress intended CERCLA to require
parties responsible for creating hazardous waste to provide
payment for clean up, rather than burdening those injured by
the pollution with the cost.'86
These policies, and others noted above,8 7 are potent ra-.
tionale weighing in favor of adopting successor liability as a
CERCLA general rule. Part of the congressional debate on
CERCLA focused on how to enact a comprehensive liability
statute placing the financial obligations of clean up on the par-
ties who mismanaged their hazardous substances." The goal
179. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,
91-92 (3rd Cir. 1988).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 14.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (transporter liability is subject to a limitation
that the, site must be selected by the person transporting the hazardous sub.
stance).
183. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
184. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. Mich.
1989), f 'v4 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See supra notes 5 and 153.
185. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
186. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 33 (1980).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 15-27.
188. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. The goal of the legislation was "to
provide the beginning of an equitable solution to the environmental and health
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was imposing liability widely and equitably, while not allowing
corporations to elude responsibility for the problems they cre-
ated.
This balancing of equities weighs the interests of the party
injured by the hazardous substances against those of the pollut-
ers. In these circumstances, Congress believed the injured par-
ty should prevail." CERCLA's drafters intended to rely upon
responsible corporate deep pockets"9 for future clean up
costs and to use Superfund as a last resort.' This policy, to-
gether with Senator Randolph's statement regarding the reten-
tion of the common law for CERCLA lawsuits as discussed
above,'" favors the imposition of successor liability under
CERCLA.
The majority of the courts examining this issue have
agreed and adopted successor liability for CERCLA cases. The
case most vociferous in its approval, as well as in its interpreta-
tion of the legislative history, was Smith Land. To reach its deci-
sion, the court in Smith Land made major inferences regarding
congressional intent. The court extrapolated successor liability
from an absence of statutory language to the contrary. It be-
lieved successor liability was not included in the statute be-
cause CERCLA was quickly put together during the last days
of Congress.' This reasoning is reinforced by the general
and documented congressional belief that the responsible par-
ties should pay recovery costs." Additional support for this
position is found in the premise that the government and in-
jured parties should not bear the burdens of the mistakes (or
intentions) of polluters. 5
problems created by decades of reckless and irresponsible disposal of chemical
wastes." H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
189. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. This is especially apparent due to
Congress' attempt to include as many involved parties as possible in the group of
PRPs. (This is readily seen in the statute itself.) Almost anyone having anything to
do with the hazardous substances is liable for cleanup costs.
190. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. The legislation is "intended to give ac-
cess to the 'deep pockets' of whatever company has the money to pay regardless
of the degree of culpability." H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
191. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, (1980).
192. See supra text accompanying note 23.
193. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
194. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
195. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2.
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In applying this general intent, it is a short step to adopt
common law successor liability for CERCLA cases." The
majority of jurisdictions have followed Smith Land and taken
that step, but there has not been uniform application of the
common law. In Smith Land, the court derived responsibility
for successor corporations from general statements of Con-
gress and considerations of equity.'" The idea of fairness,
which led to the court's decision, suggested that the taxpayer
should not bear the burden while the successor corporation
received the benefit of the predecessor's polluting.' In its
imposition of successor liability, Smith Land discussed its appli-
cation in a limited factual context.
The court reiterated the common law principles of liability
in a statutory merger or consolidation.'" The fact that a
merger or consolidation occurred under statutory authority
made the imposition of liability easier for the court to accept;
it was merely an assumption of responsibility by the surviving
corporation' and no more.
Although the court in Smith Land did not cite any direct
precedent imposing successor liability in a federal suit under
section 9607, the holding bears out the intent of Congress" '
and the important consideration of fundamental fairness. This
concept of fairness, when applied in connection with
CERCLA's remedial purpose, results in a potent combination.
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it intended the govern-
ment to provide back-up support to private, responsible par-
ties.' Allowing corporations which have merged or consoli-
dated pursuant to statute to escape liability thrusts the govern-
196. This is obviously the feeling guiding the court in Smith Land. Sec Smith
Land, 851 F.2d at 91.
197. Id. This rationale is demonstrated by the court's notation that the benefits
of the pollution went to the successor through its predecessor and the public did
not really benefit at all. Id. at 92.
198. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2. "This fund is to be used to . . . clean
up abandoned hazardous waste sites when the company or companies responsible
for creating the problem either no longer exist, cannot be identified or lack the
financial resources to clean up their own messes." Id.
199. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
200. Id
201. See supra note 2.
202. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, (1980).
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ment to the forefront of parties bearing response costs. °0
This shift should only occur if the responsible party cannot pay
under any circumstances. In a merger or consolidation, the
responsible party generally possesses the means to pay.
Generally, in a merger or consolidation the old corpora-
tion has been consumed by the new one and the primary busi-
ness operations of the old continue. The old corporation con-
tinues to exist, but under the guise of a new name or board of
directors. It is not unjust, therefore, to make the new corpora-
tion liable for the consequences of the pollution of the old.
On the contrary, the new corporation directly acceded to
the benefits the former enjoyed, such as cost savings resulting
from improper disposal. The acquiring corporation likely pur-
chased the former business at a lower cost due to the absence
of elaborate and expensive pollution control systems. By as-
suming these potential "benefits," the new corporation also
accepts the risks.
Proponents of the contrary position believe the successor
does not accept these risks; the Anspec court's decision was
based on strict statutory construction.' Section 9607 does
not provide a foundation for successor liability and so the
court declined to apply the common law rule.
A strict reading of section 9607(a) overlooks the policy
behind CERCLA and the proper role of the federal govern-
ment. The Anspec court approached CERCLA with the belief
that response costs can be adequately recovered from the oth-
er categories of PRPs.' However, if there are no other avail-
able PRPs, then the federal government is left to pay the clean
up costs.' The result in Anspec provides successor corpora-
tions with an easy escape-a polluter can merge with another
corporation and not incur liability for CEROLA response costs.
The Anspec court assumed Superfund will provide an un-
ending source of federal money to finance hazardous sub-
stance clean ups. This is unrealistic. Superfund is not a bottom-
less well of funding; rather, it must be continually replenished
203. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
204. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 734 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. Mich.
1989), rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See supra notes 5 and 153.
205. Generators, transporters and past and present owners and operators.
206. Anspec, 734 F. Supp. at 796, rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See supra notes
5 and 153.
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by Congress.' Superfund is designed to provide an alterna-
tive to private party funding and should be tapped only in the
absence of an identifiable responsible party.'
In light of the increasing number of polluted sites and limited
federal resources, the "Super" fund will provide only a fraction
of all the funding necessary.'
The Smith Land court adopted the common law successor
liability rule for modern environmental clean up problems.
From this, the federal courts are now embroiled in disputes
over the application of the rule's exceptions.21 Although a
majority of courts have followed Smith Land, its adoption has
not been universal.'
The common law rule the court imposed in Smith Land
results in non-liability for a corporate successor in an asset pur-
chase."' The court in Asarco reached this conclusion from its
application of the common law principles discussed in Smith
Land.1 s It is contrary to CERCLA's remedial ideals to allow
any PRP to escape liability in this manner.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1) (1982). This section states in full:
There are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Trea-
sury not otherwise appropriated, to the Response Trust Fund
[Superfund] amounts determined by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury ... to be equivalent to-
(A) the amounts received in the Treasury under section 4611
or 4661 of title 26,
(B) the amounts recovered on behalf of the Response Trust
Fund under this chapter,
(C) all moneys recovered or collected under section
1321(bX6XB) of title 33,
(D) penalties assessed under subchapter I of this chapter, and
(E) punitive damages under section 9607(cX3) of this title.
208. For example, if all PRPs have declared bankruptcy.
209. For example, in 1984 the "estimated cost of cleaning 1,800 sites 'could
run as high as $11.4 billion' in 1983 constant dollars, in addition to the $1.6 bil-
lion authorized for the [Sluperfund . . . ." 14 Env't Rep. 1725 (BNA Feb. 3,
1984) (quoting SUPERFUND TASK FORCE REPORT, EPA SUPERFUND TASK FORCE
(1983)).
210. This is readily observed in the mere continuation exception. Some courts
have developed similar theories, i.e., the continuing business enterprise exception,
etc.
211. For example, it was not adopted by the district court in Anspec. Anspec,
734 F. Supp at 795, ev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (1991). See supra notes 5 and 153.
212. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990).
213. Id.
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For example, in an asset purchase, the new company buys
out the old polluter and the same rationales which guided the
imposition of liability in a merger or consolidation apply once
more. The buyer likely paid a lower price for the polluting
company than if the corporation had practiced environmental-
ly conscious policies. The courts have left a loophole which, in
the interest of the environment, must be closed. Asset purchas-
es are only one of the areas where the problems of imposing
liability lie.
Other problems arise due to the contract interpretations
which courts must engage in to find an express or implied
assumption of liability. Courts must examine contract provi-
sions to find language indicating an assumption of liability in
an asset purchase.214 Utilizing this exception to non-liability
leads courts into the thicket of parole evidence.21 It also cre-
ates potential findings of liability where none exists, so as to
impose it on a deserving party.
This element of unfairness is minimized in the de facto
merger exception. Under this doctrine the courts examine an
array of factors to determine if the new corporation is merely
the same wolf now dressed in sheep's clothing."6 The test re-
quires continuity in virtually all facets of the corporation, cessa-
tion and liquidation of the seller, and assumption of business
obligations by the buyer." '
National Can adopted the general rule and applied the de
facto merger exception." The continuity of business opera-
tions requirements, along with the dissolution of the predeces-
sor, convinced the court the successor should be liable."
9
The four prongs of the de facto merger test" provide an eq-
uitable basis on which to impose liability.
214. See also United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1997
(D. Del. Aug. 28, 1990).
215. The parole evidence rule is "[t]he rule which excludes evidence of prior
or contemporaneous oral agreements which would vary a written contract."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (3d ed. 1969).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 89-104.
217. American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg., No. 89-C0168, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *19 (N.D. III. Aug. 20, 1990).
218. Id. at *25.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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This test determines if a merger has actually occurred
despite the label the parties have attached to the transaction. If
the stockholders, management, personnel, assets and business
location remain the same and there is a liquidation and as-
sumption of contractual obligations, then liability is warranted.
This exception is in line with CERCLA's basic remedial princi-
ples. Although the "real" PRP has dissolved, its essence, and
hence its liability, continue in the "new" corporation.
This is also true for the "mere continuation" exception.
The mere continuation theory applies liability if the same basic
officers, directors and shareholders are present in the new
corporation as were in the old."' The court in Thomas Solvent
found mere continuation to be a well-balanced remedy sup-
ported by the belief that corporations should not evade liabili-
ty for the clean up costs resulting from their actions.2 Nor
should society be forced to bear the brunt of those costs." s
Thomas Solvent also viewed successor liability as an oppor-
tunity to promote prevention. 4 If successors are faced with
the prospect of liability for the predecessor's actions following
a merger, there is incentive to avoid polluting." This factor
could weigh heavily in corporate decisions on environmental
practices.
As noted earlier, courts have not applied mere continua-
tion consistently." The exception has spawned the substan-
tial continuity and continuing business enterprise excep-
tions."7 Substantial continuity is found, and liability imposed,
if the business remains the same, the employees stay in the
same positions and the same product is produced and bought
by the same customers.' The court in Carolina Transformer
applied this test because the continuity of shareholders be-
221. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (W.D. Mich.
1988).
222. Id.
223. Id. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
224. Id. See also (author), Comment, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Liti-
gation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458 (1986) (discussing incentives for safer waste disposal
under CERCLA).
225. Thomas Solvent 725 F. Supp. at 1459.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 124-43.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 124-43.
228. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1039 (E.D.
N.C. 1989).
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tween the predecessor, Carolina Transformer, and the succes-
sor, FayTranCo, needed to satisfy the mere continuation doc-
trine was missing.'
The substantial continuity test is easier to satisfy because
there are no requirements regarding continuity of officers,
directors and shareholders. It imposes liability in the asset
purchase of a corporation when the employees and business
operations of the selling corporation are retained. 3 '
Business operations were also the focus of the defendant's
proposed continuing business enterprise test in Asarco.'
There are only two differences between the continuing busi-
ness enterprise and substantial continuity tests. The former
test includes the elements of the substantial continuity test but
also requires the company name to remain the same and the
successor to hold itself out as the predecessor..
2 3 Thus, the
continuing business enterprise test is more difficult to apply
than substantial continuity because of these two additional
requirements. 2" Like substantial continuity, there is no need
to show a continuation of officers, directors or shareholders.
Therefore, the continuing business enterprise exception adds
little to the already established rules.
The court in Asarco neither adopted the proposed test nor
discounted it as a viable alternative. The court decided the
doctrine was not relevant to the facts before it
35 and the test
awaits application by a court in the appropriate circumstances.
Mere continuation evolved further under the EPA ap-
proach to successor liability. The EPA's proposed continuity of
business operations formula deletes the continuity of owner-
ship requirement found in mere continuation. The two prongs
of the test are: (1) the acquisition of assets and (2) mainte-
nance of essentially the same business operations. If both
229. Id. at 1033. Dewey Strother owned 100% of Carolina Transformer and his
son and daughter each owned 50% of FayTranCo. Id.
230. Recall that in Carolina Transforrmer there was a continuity of directors and
officers. I. at 1034.
231. Id. at 1039.
232. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1265 n.7 (9th Cir.
1990).
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 124-43.
235. Asarro, 909 F.2d at 1265.
236. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 14.
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of these occur, liability is immediate."7 This approach is simi-
lar to the substantial continuity test in its elimination of the
need for continuity of ownership.'
The continuing business enterprise proposal in Asarco is
also similar to the EPA's approach. However, the Asarco test
added elements which defeat the exception's purpose. For
example, the necessity of retaining the same name allows many
corporations to elude liability by a mere name change."9 The
EPA test is easier to prove than either the substantial continu-
ity or continuing business enterprise doctrines because of its
less complicated requirements. The EPA test is also less com-
plex than the de facto merger test. 40 Under the EPA test, a
continuation of corporate ownership is irrelevant, whereas it is
a necessary element to the defacto merger test."
The EPA's continuity of business operations theory applies
responsibility if the buying corporation continues the same ba-
sic business as the selling corporation.24 This theory liberally
imposes CERCLA liability and fulfills CERCLA's remedial pur-
pose. It also places the government in its supplemental role to
private polluters. Imposing liability under the EPA's test is
attractive because, as seen with the other theories, the new cor-
poration acquired the benefits of the predecessor's pollut-
ing-benefits which continue after acquisition.4 '
The complexity created by the outgrowths of the mere
continuation exception is countered by the simplicity of the
fraud doctrine. Courts impose liability for fraud when a con-
237. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 14.
238. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 14.
239. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1265 n.7 (9th Cir.
1990).
240. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 10.
241. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 10. Recall that continuity of ownership
is required for both the tests in Asarco and Carolina Transformer.
242. Memorandum, supra note 168, at 10. One example of continuing the
same basic business operations is the case when the old corporation sold choco-
late chip cookies and the new sells only chocolate chips.
243. This is clarified by the following hypothetical: Assume that when Nicetry,
Inc. acquired Waste Co. it did so at a price reflecting Waste's savings from its
polluting activities. As Nicetry carries on the same business operations as Waste, it
continues to benefit from the lower costs of Waste's dumping or inadequately
containing hazardous waste. This savings results even if Nicetry has nothing to do
with Waste's operations, but acquires it merely for investment purposes. By virute
of a lower purchase price, the benefit passes along to the successor corporation.
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veyance has occurred to avoid creditors.2 If a successor can
prove the corporate conveyance occurred in good faith and for
value, a presumption of validity attaches. 45
The difficulty with the fraud exception lies in proving the
fraudulent conveyance. The bad faith requirement applies a
subjective test to corporate boards of directors that is difficult
to prove absent specific statements or board resolutions.
46
The problem is difficult, but not always insurmountable.
In Thomas Solvent the proof problem was overcome and
the court could have imposed liability under the fraud excep-
tion."7 This is because immediately preceding the fraudulent
creation of several spinoff corporations one of the directors ex-
pressed concern about avoiding possible environmental liabili-
ty. 24  In most cases such overt admissions would not be
found. As the CERCLA liability net drifts wider, corporations
will be more circumspect and liability more difficult to attach.
VI. PROPOSAL
The application of the common law doctrine is unwieldy
and has yet to be universally accepted. The exceptions contin-
ue to evolve to the point where they almost overshadow the
rule. A simple and equitable solution, reflecting congressional
intent in enacting CERCLA, is needed. Fulfilling congressional
intent requires all corporations, no matter what their form (i.e.
predecessor or successor), to be responsible for the environ-
mental hazards they create.
The EPA continuity of business operations test provides
an answer to this dilemma. It is a simple and ready rule for the
courts to apply. 9 The test is also equitable to both corpora-
tions and taxpayers. If a corporation is acquired and its busi-
ness operations ceased entirely or are drastically altered, then
liability is not imposed. Additionally, if a corporation is pur-
244. See Toxic Tort II, sipra note 145, at 1086.
245. See Toxic Tot II, supra note 145, at 1086.
246. See supra text accompanying notes at 144-47.
247. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. Fraud was also proven
against Thomas Solvent for their attempt to defraud creditors by creating the
spin-off corporations. See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1457
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
248. Thomas Solvent, 725 F. Supp. at 1449.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 167-78.
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chased and continues as it was prior to acquisition, the taxpay-
ers will not bear the costs of the successor's gains.
In addition to the EPA test, liability should continue to be
imposed if a merger or consolidation occurs as in Smith Land.
Merger or consolidation liability is included because the result
of such a corporate combination is a benefit to the new corpo-
ration gained through the old's irresponsible environmental
policies. In this way, CERCLA's reach is widened to include
corporate parties who change form through asset purchases,
mergers and consolidations.
An amendment to CERCLA would implement this rule.
Subdivision (a)(5), added to section 9607, would read:
(a)(5) any corporation that merges or has merged, consoli-
dates or has consolidated, acquires or has acquired the
assets of and carries on substantially the same business op-
erations as the selling corporation, one of the parties listed
above, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a state or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assess-
ing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release, and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health ef-
fects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this ti-
tle.250
The rest of the statute would not change. Potential forms
of liability would also remain the same.23' An amendment to
CERCLA would cure the statutory construction problem faced
by the district court in Anspec and provide a workable rule
while spreading liability to the responsible parties. There
would be specific statutory guidance, which the court in Anspec
250. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
251. Successor corporations will be liable for: "(A) all costs of removal or re-
medial action incurred by the United States . . . ; (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person . . . ; (C) damages for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources . . . and (D) the costs of any health
assessment or health effects study." 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
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thought was lacking. Congress will have spoken on the issue
and included some corporate successors in the group of PRPs.
The new section also would encourage corporations to
reformulate their environmental practices to avoid successor
liability. A corporation must plan for the future. If a successor
corporation is aware it may be held liable for its predecessor's
environmental costs, it may be deterred from its plans to
merge with the predecessor. This will create major stumbling
blocks for businesses. To avoid these obstacles, corporations
will be environmentally conscious to remain attractive to po-
tential business developments. If the proposed section 9607(a)
were implemented, corporations would be required to think
environmentally to remain open to future business activities.
VII. CONCLUSION
To cope with CERCLA's lack of statutory guidance on
corporate successor liability, courts have chosen to follow sev-
eral routes. One route draws upon the common law rule of
successor liability and imposes liability, if the potentially re-
sponsible party has merged or consolidated.'
2 Under this
rule liability is not imposed if the corporation was acquired by
an asset sale, unless one of the four exceptions (fraud, mere
continuation, defacto merger or assumption of liability) applies.
One court has adopted a substantial continuity exception,
"
while another has considered a continuing business enterprise
exception' M to the rule of non-liability.
Yet another court has decided to strictly construe
CERCLA and not impose liability under the common law
rules. 5 Furthermore, the EPA has developed its own posi-
tion on successor liability. The EPA test applies the common
law rules and liability if the new corporation continues the
business operations of the old.2"
To remedy the division among the federal courts, and to
promote congressional intent and CERCLA's remedial goals,
liability should be imposed on successor corporations.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 126-35.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 136-43.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 155-66. See also supra note 5.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 167-78.
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CERCLA should be amended to impose liability on successor
corporations arising from mergers, consolidations and asset
sales which continue the same basic business operations of the
predecessor corporations.
Lisa Cope
